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Abstract
Partial monitoring is a generalization of the well-known multi-armed bandit
framework where the loss is not directly observed by the learner. We complete the
classification of finite adversarial partial monitoring to include all games, solving
an open problem posed by Barto´k et al. [2014]. Along the way we simplify
and improve existing algorithms and correct errors in previous analyses. Our
second contribution is a new algorithm for the class of games studied by Barto´k
[2013] where we prove upper and lower regret bounds that shed more light on the
dependence of the regret on the game structure.
1 Introduction
Partial monitoring is a generalization of the bandit framework that relaxes the relationship between
the feedback and the loss, which makes the framework applicable to a wider range of practical
problems such as spam filtering and product testing. Equally importantly, it offers a rich and elegant
framework to study the exploration-exploitation dilemma beyond bandits [Rustichini, 1999].
We consider the finite adversarial version of the problem where a learner and adversary interact over
n rounds. At the start of the game the adversary secretly chooses a sequence of n outcomes from
a finite set. In each round the learner chooses one of finitely many actions and receives a feedback
that depends on its action and the choice of the adversary for that round. The loss is also determined
by the action/outcome pair, but is not directly observed by the learner. Although the learner does
not know the choices of the adversary, the feedback/loss functions are known in advance and the
learner must use this infer a good policy. The learner’s goal is to minimize the regret, which is the
difference between the total loss suffered and the loss that would have been suffered by playing the
best single action given knowledge of the adversaries choices.
The study of partial monitoring games started with the work by Rustichini [1999] where the
definition of regret differed slightly from what is used here and the results have an asymptotic flavor.
These results have been strengthened in an interesting line of work by Mannor and Shimkin [2003],
Perchet [2011], Mannor et al. [2014], the last of which gives non-asymptotic rates for this more
general definition of regret that unfortunately do not reduce to the optimal rate in our setting. The
regret we consider was first considered by Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [2001], who showed that a
variant of exponential weights achieves O(n3/4) regret in nontrivial games. This was improved to
O(n2/3) by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2006], who also showed that in general this result is not improvable,
but that there exist many types of game for which the regret is O(n1/2). They posed the question
of classifying finite adversarial partial monitoring games in terms of the achievable minimax regret.
An effort started around 2010 to achieve this goal, which eventually led to the paper by Barto´k et al.
[2014] who made significant progress towards solving this problem. In particular, they gave an
almost complete characterization of partial monitoring games by identifying four regimes: trivial,
easy, hard and hopeless games. The characterization, however, left out the set of games with actions
that are only optimal on low-dimensional subspaces of the adversaries choices. Although these
actions are never uniquely optimal, they can be informative and until now it was not known how
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to use these actions when balancing exploration and exploitation. Games in this tricky regime
have been called ‘degenerate’, but there is no particular reason to believe these games should not
appear in practice. This problem is understood in the stochastic variant of partial monitoring where
the adversary chooses the outcomes independently at random [Antos et al., 2013], but a complete
understanding of the adversarial setup has remained elusive.
Contributions
• We develop an improved version of NEIGHBOURHOODWATCH by Foster and Rakhlin [2012]
that correctly deals with degenerate games and completes the classification for all finite partial
monitoring games, closing an open question posed by Barto´k et al. [2014].1 Another benefit is that
Foster and Rakhlin [2012] and Barto´k et al. [2014] inadvertently exchanged an expectation and
maximum during the localisation argument of their analysis. A correction is presumably possible,
but this would add another level of complexity to an already intricate proof. Our algorithm also
enjoys a regret guarantee that holds with high probability.
• Barto´k [2013] introduced a class of partial monitoring games and suggested a complicated
algorithm with improved regret relative to NEIGHBOURHOODWATCH. We propose a novel
algorithm and prove that for these games its regret satisfies O(F
√
nKloc log(K)), where K is
the number of actions and F is the number of feedback symbols. The quantity Kloc depends on
the game and satisfies Kloc ≤ K . This bound improves on the result of Barto´k [2013] in several
ways: (a) we eliminate the dependence on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants, (b) the
new algorithm is simpler, (c) our bound is better by logarithmic factors of the horizon and (d)
the analysis by Barto´k mistakenly combines bounds that hold in expectation in ‘local games’ into
a bound for the whole game as if they were high probability bounds. We expect this could be
corrected by modifying the algorithm and analysis, but the resulting algorithm would be even
more complicated and the regret would not improve.
• We prove a variety of lower bounds. First correcting a minor error in the proof by Barto´k et al.
[2014] and second showing the linear dependence on the number of feedbacks is unavoidable in
general.
• The new algorithms and analysis simplify existing results, which think is a contribution in its own
right and we hope encourages more research into this fascinating topic with many open questions.
Problem setup Given a natural numbern let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}. We use 〈x, y〉 to denote the usual
inner product in Euclidean space. The d-simplex is Pd = {x ∈ [0, 1]d+1 : ‖x‖1 = 1}, where for
p ≥ 1, ‖x‖p is the p-norm of x. The relative interior of Pd is ri(Pd) = {x ∈ (0, 1)d+1 : ‖x‖1 = 1}.
The dimension of a set A ⊂ Rd+1 is the dimension of its affine hull. For any set A the indicator
function is 1A(·) and for function f : A→ R the supremumnorm of f is ‖f‖∞ = supa∈A |f(a)|. A
partial monitoring problemG = (L,Φ) is a game between a learner and an adversary over n rounds
and is specified by a loss matrix L ∈ [0, 1]K×E and a feedback matrix Φ ∈ [F ]K×E for natural
numbers E,F andK . At the beginning of the game the learner is given L and Φ and the adversary
secretly chooses a sequence of outcomes i1:n = (i1, . . . , in) where it ∈ [E] for each t ∈ [n]. In
each round t the learner chooses an action At ∈ [K] and observes feedback Φt = ΦAtit . The loss
incurred by playing action a in round t is yta = Lait . In contrast to bandit and full information
problems the loss in partial monitoring is not observed by the learner, even for the action played.
Game type R∗n(G)
Trivial 0
Easy Θ˜(n1/2)
Hard Θ(n2/3)
Hopeless Ω(n)
A policy π is a map from sequences of action/observation pairs to a
distribution over the action-set [K]. The performance of a policy π is
measured by its regret, Rn(π, i1:n) = maxa∈[K]
∑n
t=1(ytAt − yta).
When the outcome sequence and policy are fixed we abbreviate Rn =
Rn(π, i1:n). The minimax expected regret associated with partial
monitoring gameG is the worst-case expected regret of the best policy.
R∗n(G) = infπmaxi1:n E[Rn(π, i1:n)] where the inf is taken over all
policies, the max over all outcome sequences of length n and the expectation with respect to the
randomness in the actions. We let Ft = σ(A1, A2, . . . , At) be the σ-algebra generated by the
information available after round t and abbreviate Et[·] = E[·|Ft]. A core question in partial
1Historical note: Foster and Rakhlin [2012] claim a modification of their argument would handle degenerate
games but give no details. The followup paper explicitly mentions the difficulties and poses the open problem
[Barto´k et al., 2014, Remark 4 and §8].
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monitoring is to understand how L and Φ affect the growth of R∗n(G) in terms of the horizon. The
main theorem of Barto´k et al. [2014] shows that for all ‘nondegenerate’ games the minimax regret
falls into one of four categories as illustrated in the table. The colloquial meaning of the adjective
degenerate suggests that only nondegenerate games are interesting, but this is not the case. The term
is used in a technical sense (to be clarified soon) referring to a subclass of games that we have no
reason to believe should be less important than the nondegenerate ones.
Preliminaries To illustrate some of the difficulties of partial monitoring relative to bandits we
formalize a simplistic version of the spam filtering problem.
Loss (L) Spam Not spam
Spam 0 1
Not spam 1 0
Don’t know c c
Feedback (Φ) Spam Not spam
Spam 1 1
Not spam 1 1
Don’t know 1 2
Example 1 Let c ≥ 0 and define partial monitoring
gameG = (L,Φ) by
L =
(
0 1
1 0
c c
)
, Φ =
(
1 1
1 1
1 2
)
.
The idea is also illustrated in the tables on the right.
Rows correspond to actions of the learner and columns
to outcomes selected by the adversary. The learner has three actions in this game corresponding to
‘spam’, ‘not spam’ and ‘don’t know’ while the adversary chooses between ‘spam’ and ‘not spam’.
The learner suffers a loss of 1 if it guesses incorrectly. Alternatively the learner can say they don’t
know in which case they suffer a loss of c and observe some meaningful feedback. The minimax
regret for this game depends on the price of information. If c > 1/2, then the minimax regret is
Θ(n2/3). On the other hand, if c ∈ (0, 1/2] the minimax regret is Θ˜(n1/2) where Θ˜(·) indicates
growth up to logarithmic factors. Finally, when c = 0 a policy can suffer no regret by playing just
the third action.
L =
(
0 1
1 0
)
Φ =
(
1 1
1 1
)
Example 2 The game on the right is hopeless because the learner
cannot gain information about her loss and the adversary can always
force the expected regret to be Ω(n).
Cell decomposition In order to understand what makes a partial monitoring game hard, easy or
hopeless, it helps to introduce a linear structure. Let ut = eit ∈ PE−1 be the standard basis vector
that is nonzero in the coordinate of the outcome it chosen by the adversary in round t. For action
a let ℓa ∈ [0, 1]E be the ath row of matrix L. The cell Ca of action a is the subset of PE−1 on
which action a is optimal: Ca = {u ∈ PE−1 : maxb∈[K]〈ℓa − ℓb, u〉 = 0}. Action a is optimal
in hindsight if and only if 1n
∑n
t=1 ut ∈ Ca. Each nonempty Ca is a polytope and the collection{Ca : a ∈ [K]} is called the cell decomposition of G. An action is called dominated if it is never
optimal: Ca = ∅. We define the dimension of nondominated action a to be the dimension of Ca,
which ranges between 0 andE−1. Nondominated actions with dimension less thanE−1 are called
degeneratewhile actions with dimensionE−1 are called Pareto optimal. A partial monitoring game
is degenerate if it has at least one degenerate action. For each u ∈ PE−1 let a∗u ∈ argmina〈ℓa, u〉
and a∗t ∈ argmina
∑t
s=1〈ℓa, us〉, which means that a∗u is an optimal action if the adversary is
playing u on average and a∗t is the optimal action in hindsight when the adversary plays the sequence
(u1, . . . , ut). Without loss of generality we assume that a
∗
u and a
∗
t are nondegenerate. A pair of
nondegenerate actions a, b are neighbors if Ca ∩Cb has dimension E− 2. They are weak neighbors
if Ca ∩ Cb 6= ∅. Actions a and b are called duplicates if ℓa = ℓb. We let Na be the set of actions
consisting of a and its neighbors (but not the duplicates of a). For any pair of neighbors (a, b) let
Nab = {c ∈ [K] : Ca ∩ Cb ⊆ Cc}. Although a is not a neighbor of itself we defineNaa = ∅.
Lemma 1 (Barto´k et al. 2014, Lem. 11). Let a and b be neighbors. Then for all d ∈ Nab there exists
a unique α ∈ [0, 1] such that ℓd = αℓa + (1− α)ℓb.
A corollary is that for d ∈ Nab and ifα from the lemma lies in (0, 1), thenCd = Ca∩Cb. Degenerate
and dominated actions can never be uniquely optimal in hindsight, but they can provide information
to the learner that proves the difference between a hard and hopeless game (or easy and hard). This
is also true for duplicate actions, which have the same loss, but not necessarily the same feedback.
Observability The neighborhood structure determines which actions can be uniquely optimal and
when. This is only half of the story. The other half is the relationship between the feedback and
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loss matrices that defines the difficulty of identifying the optimal action. A natural first attempt
towards designing an algorithm would be to construct an unbiased estimator of yta for each Pareto
optimal action a. A moments thought produces easy games where this is impossible (Exhibit 1
in Appendix I). A more fruitful idea is to estimate the loss differences yta − ytb for Pareto
optimal actions a and b, which is sufficient (and essentially necessary) to discover the optimal
action. Suppose in round t the learner has chosen to sample At ∼ Pt where Pt ∈ ri(PK−1).
A conditionally unbiased estimator of yta − ytb is a function g : [K] × [F ] → R such that
Et−1[g(At,Φt)] =
∑
a Ptag(a,Φait) = yta − ytb. Whether or not such an estimator exists and
its structure determines the difficulty of a partial monitoring game. A pair of actions (a, b) are called
globally observable if there exists a function v : [K]× [F ]→ R such that
K∑
c=1
v(c,Φci) = ℓai − ℓbi for all i ∈ [E] . (1)
They are locally observable if in addition to the above a and b are neighbors and v(c, f) = 0
whenever c /∈ Nab. Finally, they are pairwise observable if v(c, f) = 0 whenever c /∈ {a, b}. If
the learner is sampling action At from distribution Pt ∈ ri(PK−1), then the existence of a function
satisfying Eq. (1) means that v(At,Φt)/PtAt is an unbiased estimator of 〈ℓa−ℓb, ut〉 = yta−ytb. A
gameG is called globally/locally observable if all pairs of neighbors are globally/locally observable.
A game is called point-locally observable if all pairs of weak neighbors are pairwise observable. The
cell decomposition and observability structure for the spam game is described in detail in Exhibit 2.
Note that in globally observable games it is easy to see that any pair of Pareto optimal actions are
globally observable, not just the neighbors.
2 Classification theorem
The following theorem classifies partial monitoring games into four categories depending on the
observability structure.
Theorem 1. The minimax regret of partial monitoring game G = (L,Φ) satisfies
R∗n(G) =


0, if G has no pairs of neighboring actions ;
Θ˜(
√
n), if G is locally observable and has neighboring actions ;
Θ(n2/3), if G is globally observable, but not locally observable ;
Ω(n), otherwise .
The theorem follows by proving upper and lower bounds for each class of games. Most of
the pieces already exist in the literature. The upper bound for globally observable games is by
Cesa-Bianchi et al. [2006]. The upper bound for games with no pairs of neighboring actions is
trivial, since in this case there exists an action a with Ca = PE−1 and playing this action alone
ensures zero regret. The lower bound for easy games is by Antos et al. [2013, §6] and for hard
games by Barto´k et al. [2014, §4]. All that remains is to prove an upper bound for locally observable
games with at least one pair of neighboring actions.
3 Algorithm for locally observable games
C3
C2
C1
u1
u2
C4
C5
C6Fix a locally observable game G = (L,Φ) with at least one
pair of neighboring actions. We introduce a policy called
NEIGHBORHOODWATCH2 (Algorithm 1).
Preprocessing The new algorithm always chooses its action At ∈ ∪a,bNab where the union is
over pairs of neighboring actions. For example, in the game with cell decomposition shown in the
figure the policy only plays actions 1, 2, 3 and 4. Removing (some) degenerate actions can only
increase the minimax regret so from now on we assume that all actions in [K] are in Nab for some
neighbors a and b. Let A be an arbitrary largest subset of Pareto optimal actions such that A does
not contain actions that are duplicates of each other and D = [K] \ A be the remaining actions.
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Estimating loss differences The definition of local observability means that for each pair of
neighboring actions a, b there exists a function vab : [K] × [F ] → R satisfying Eq. (1) and
with vab(c, f) = 0 whenever c /∈ Nab. Even though a is not a neighbor of itself, for notational
convenience we define vaa(c, f) = 0 for all c and f . The policy works for any such of vab, but the
analysis suggests minimizing V = maxa,b ‖vab‖∞ with the maximum over all pairs of neighbors.
Algorithm 1 NEIGHBORHOODWATCH2
1: Input L, Φ, η, γ
2: for t ∈ 1, . . . , n do
3: For a, k ∈ [K] let Qtka = 1A(k)
1Nk∩A(a) exp
(
−η∑t−1s=1 Z˜ska)∑
b∈Nk∩A
exp
(
−η∑t−1s=1 Z˜ska) + 1D(k)
1A(a)
|A|
4: Find distribution P˜t such that P˜
⊤
t = P˜
⊤
t Qt
5: Compute Pt = (1− γ)REDISTRIBUTE(P˜t) + γK1 and sample At ∼ Pt
6: Compute loss-difference estimators for each k ∈ A and a ∈ Nk ∩ A.
Zˆtka =
P˜tkv
ak(At,Φt)
PtAt
and βtka = ηV
2
∑
b∈Nak
P˜ 2tk
Ptb
and Z˜tka = Zˆtka − βtka (2)
7: end for
8: function REDISTRIBUTE(p)
9: q ← p
10: for d ∈ D do
11: Find a, b such that d ∈ Nab and α ∈ [0, 1] such that ℓd = αℓa+(1−α)ℓb (Lemma 1)
12: ca ← αqbαqb+(1−α)qa and cb ← 1− ca and ρ← 12K min
{
pa
qaca
, pbqbcb
}
13: qd ← ρcaqa + ρcbqb and qa ← (1− ρca)qa and qb ← (1− ρcb)qb
14: end for
15: return q
16: end function
Description In each round the algorithm first computes a collection of exponential weights
distribution Qtk ∈ PK−1, one for each k ∈ A. The distribution Qtk is supported on the Nk ∩ A
when k ∈ A and for k ∈ D it is uniform on A. These local distributions are then combined into a
global distribution P˜t, which is taken to be the stationary distribution of right-stochastic matrix Qt,
which means that
P˜ta =
∑
k∈A
P˜tkQtka for any a, k ∈ A . (3)
These steps are the same as the original NEIGHBORHOODWATCH, which samples its action from
(1− γ)P˜t + γ1/K . This does not work when there are degenerate actions becauseQtkd = 0 when
d ∈ D, which by the above display means that Ptd = γ/K for actions d ∈ D and non-adaptive
forced exploration is not sufficient for O(
√
n) regret in partial monitoring. This is the role of the
redistribution function, which is analyzed formally in Appendix A. The final part of the algorithm is
to estimate the loss differences for each k ∈ A and a ∈ Nk ∩ A. Our choice of loss estimators are
another departure from the original algorithm, which only updated the estimators for one local game
in each round and then used a complicated aggregation strategy. This is one source of significant
simplification in the new algorithm.
Remark 1. The special treatment of degenerate actions using the redistribution function seems like
a big hassle. You might wonder why we did not simply include the degenerate actions in the local
games and then play the stationary distribution, possibly with a little exploration. Unfortunately this
idea does not work. Let d be a degenerate action inNak where a and k are neighbors. Then Lemma 1
shows that the loss-difference between k and d can be estimated by Zˆskd = αZˆskk + (1− α)Zˆska
with α such that ℓd = αℓk + (1 − α)ℓa. Intuitively, a degenerate action d in Nak is only useful for
learning about the loss differences between actions a and k, which suggests the algorithm should
not assign much more probability to d than the minimum probability of playing a and k. At a
technical level the proof does not go through because the predictable variation of the estimator
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above is roughly Ω(max(1/Ptk, 1/Pta)) and yet Ptd can be Ω(max(Ptk, Pta)) and in the analysis
of exponential weights these terms are required to cancel.
Remark 2. The estimators Z˜tka are negatively biased by βtka in order to prove high probability
bounds, which is reminiscent of the Exp3.P algorithm for finite-armed adversarial bandits
[Auer et al., 2002]. As a minor contribution, we generalize their analysis to the case where the
loss estimators satisfy certain constraints, rather than taking the specific importance-weighted form
used for adversarial bandits. Choosing βtka = 0 in the algorithm leads to a bound on the expected
regret as we soon show.
Theorem 2. Suppose Algorithm 1 is run on locally observable G = (L,Φ) with parameters
δ ∈ (0, 1) and η = 1V
√
log(K/δ)/(nK) and γ = V Kη. Then with probability at least 1 − δ
the regret is bounded by Rn ≤ CG
√
n log(e/δ)), where CG is a constant that depends on the game
G, but not the horizon n or confidence level δ.
The complete proof of Theorem 2 given in Appendix B. Here we prove a bound on the expected
regret in the simple case where there are no degenerate actions and βtka = 0. Although this
proof does not highlight one of our main contributions (how to deal with degenerate actions), it
does emphasize the enormous simplification of the new algorithm. The first step is a localization
argument to bound the regret in terms of the ‘local regret’ in each neighborhood. We need a simple
lemma, which for completeness we prove in the the appendix.
Lemma 2 (Barto´k et al. 2014). There exists a constant εG > 0 depending only on G such that
for all pairs of actions a, a˜ ∈ A and u ∈ Ca˜ there exists an action b ∈ Na ∩ A such that
〈ℓa − ℓa˜, u〉 ≤ 〈ℓa − ℓb, u〉/εG.
Since there are no degenerate actions, the REDISTRIBUTE function has no effect and
Pt = (1− γ)P˜t + γ1/K. Let B1, . . . , Bn be a sequence of random variables with Bt ∼ P˜t that
is conditionally independent ofAt given the observations up to time t. Then by Hoeffding-Azuma’s
inequality
Rn =
n∑
t=1
〈ℓAt − ℓa∗n , ut〉 ≤ nγ +
√
8 log(1/δ) +
n∑
t=1
〈ℓBt − ℓa∗n , ut〉 . (4)
Next we apply Lemma 2 to localize the second term,
(A) =
n∑
t=1
〈ℓBt − ℓa∗n , ut〉 =
∑
a∈[K]
〈
ℓa − ℓa∗n ,
∑
t:Bt=a
ut
〉 ≤ 1
εG
max
φ∈H
n∑
t=1
〈ℓBt − ℓφ(Bt), ut〉 ,
where H is the set of functions φ : [K] → [K] with φ(a) ∈ Na for all a. Then using Hoeffding-
Azuma’s inequality and a union bound over all φ ∈ H shows that with probability at least 1− δ,
(A) ≤ 1
εG
max
φ∈H
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈[K]
P˜ta〈ℓa − ℓφ(a), ut〉+
√
8n log
( |H|
δ
)
=
1
εG
max
φ∈H
n∑
t=1
∑
k∈[K]
P˜tk
∑
a∈Nk
Qtka〈ℓa − ℓφ(k), ut〉+
√
8n log
( |H|
δ
)
=
1
εG
∑
k∈[K]
max
b∈Nk
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈Nk
Qtka(P˜tkyta − P˜tkytb)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
local regret
+
√
8n log
( |H|
δ
)
, (5)
where the first equality uses the fact that P˜t is the stationary distribution of Qt (see (3)). The
local regret is bounded using the tools from online convex optimization. Of course the losses are
never actually observed and must be replaced with the loss difference estimators. Then it remains
to control the variance of these estimators. The ‘standard’ analysis of Exp3 [Auer et al., 1995,
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006] shows that
max
b∈Nk
n∑
t=1
Qtka
(
P˜tkyta − P˜tkytb
)
≤ log(K)
η
+ η
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈Nk
QtkaZˆ
2
tka . (6)
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In order to bound the second term we substitute the definition of Zˆtka, which shows that∑
a∈Nk
QtkaZˆ
2
tka =
∑
a∈Nk
P˜ 2tkQtkav
ak(At,Φt)
2
P 2tAt
≤ P˜tkV
2
PtAt
∑
a∈Nk
P˜tkQtka1{a,k}(At)
PtAt
≤ 2P˜tkV
2
PtAt
.
where in the first inequality we used the fact that ‖vak‖∞ ≤ V . The second inequality follows
by considering two cases. First, if At = k, then all entries of the sum are non-zero and∑
a∈Nk
P˜tkQtka = P˜tk ≤ 2PtAt , which is true by choosing γ ≤ 1/2. For the second case At = a
for a ∈ Nk and a 6= k, which means that only one term of the sum is non-zero. Then the definition
of P˜t as the stationary distribution of Qt means that P˜tkQtka ≤ P˜ta ≤ 2PtAt . Combining this with
Eqs. (4) to (6) and a union bound shows that with probability at least 1− δ.
Rn ≤ nγ + 1
εG
(
K log(K)
η
+ 2ηV 2
n∑
t=1
1
PtAt
)
+
√
8n log(2/δ) +
√
8n log
(
2|H|
δ
)
.
Now E[
∑n
t=1 P
−1
tAt
] = nK , which means that
E[Rn] ≤ nγ + 1
εG
(
K log(K)
η
+ 2ηnKV 2
)
+ 2
√
8n(1 + log(2|H|)) = O
(
KV
εG
√
n log(K)
)
,
where we first used Lemma 3 below along with naive bounding and the fact that |H| ≤ KK .
The Big-O follows by choosing η = 1V
√
log(K)/n and γ = ηKV . The choice of γ ensures
that the loss-difference estimate satisfies η|Zˆtka| ≤ ηV/PtAt ≤ ηV K/γ = 1 on which the proof of
Eq. (6) relies. We prove in Appendix G that for games without degenerate actions the loss-difference
estimators can always be chosen so that V ≤ 1 + F .
Lemma 3. Suppose a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 1 are constants and X,Y are random variables such that
P(X ≥ Y +√a log(b/δ)) ≤ δ for all δ ∈ (0, 1). Then E[X ] ≤ E[Y ] +√a(1 + log(b)).
Dealing with degenerate actions The presence of degenerate actions makes the calculation
significantly more fiddly. The first step is to show that the redistribution process guarantees that the
expected loss accumulated by playing Pt rather than P˜t is not too great. The localization argument
is then repeated and the remaining question is how to control the variance of the loss difference
estimates. The redistribution process guarantees that the degenerate actions have sufficient mass
that the variance is at most O(K) larger than what we saw in the above calculation. The process is
complicated slightly by the desire to have a high probability bound.
4 Algorithm for point-locally observable games
The weakened neighbor definition and pairwise observability makes the analysis of point-locally
observable games less delicate than locally observable games and the results are correspondingly
stronger. Perhaps the most striking improvement is that asymptotically the bound does not dependent
on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants. Here we present a simple new algorithm based on
EXP3 called RELEXP3 (‘Relative Exp3’). The name is derived from the fact that the algorithm does
not estimate losses directly, but rather the loss differences relative to an ‘anchor’ arm that varies
over time and is the arm to which the algorithm assigns the largest probability. As we shall see, this
reduces the variance of the loss difference estimates.
Preprocessing The definition of pairwise observability means that degenerate and dominated
actions are not needed to estimate the loss differences. Since removing these actions can only
increase the minimax regret, for the remainder of this section we fix a point-locally observable game
G = (L,Φ) for which there are no dominated or degenerate actions. A point-local game is a largest
subset of actions A ⊆ [K] with ⋂a∈ACa 6= ∅ (a maximal clique of the graph over actions with
edges representing weak neighbors). We letKloc be the size of the largest point-local game.
Estimation functions For each pair of actions a, b let vab be an estimation function satisfying
Eq. (1) and furthermore assume that vaa = 0 and vab(c, f) = 0 if a, b are weak neighbors and c /∈
{a, b}. The existence of these functions is guaranteed by the definition of a point-locally observable
game. Given pair of actions a, b let Sab be the set of actions needed to estimate the loss difference
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between a and b, which is Sab = {a, b} ∪ {c ∈ [K] : exists f ∈ [F ] such that vab(c, f) 6= 0}.
Our assumptions ensure that Sab = {a, b} if a and b are weak neighbors. Define V ab = ‖vab‖∞
and V = maxa,b∈[K] V
ab and Vloc = maxa,b:Ca∩Cb 6=∅ V
ab. We show in Appendix G that vab can
be chosen so that Vloc ≤ 1 + F .
Decreasing learning rates The algorithm makes use of a sequence of decreasing learning rates
(ηt)
∞
t=1 and exploration parameters (αt)
∞
t=1. On top of this the algorithm also has a dynamic
exploration component that ensures the loss difference estimates are not too large. The decreasing
learning rate is one of the essential innovations that allows us to prove an asymptotic bound that is
independent of arbitrarily large game-dependent quantities. As an added bonus, it also means the
algorithm does not require advance knowledge of the horizon.
Algorithm 2 RELEXP3
1: Lˆ0a = 0 for all a ∈ [K]
2: for t = 1, . . . , n do
3: For each a ∈ [K] let P˜ta = exp(−ηtLˆt−1,a)∑K
b=1 exp(−ηtLˆt−1,b)
4: Let Bt = argmaxa P˜ta and Mt =
{
a : P˜ta exp
(
ηtV
aBt
αt
)
>
ηt
t
}
5: Let St =
⋃
a∈Mt
SaBt and γta = 1St(a)ηt max
a∈Mt
V aBt+
αt
K
and Pt = (1−‖γt‖1)P˜ta+γt
6: Sample At ∼ Pt and observe feedback Φt
7: For each a ∈ [K] compute estimates Zˆta = v
aBt(At,Φt)
PtAt
and update Lˆta = Lˆt−1,a + Zˆta
8: end for
Theorem 3. LetG = (L,Φ) be point-locally observable, then with appropriately tuned parameters
RELEXP3 satisfies lim supn→∞ E[Rn]/
√
n ≤ 8√2Kloc(1 + F )(2 + F ) log(K). Furthermore, the
linear dependence on F is unavoidable (see Appendix E).
Note that the constant hidden by the asymptotics does depend on arbitrarily large game-dependent
constants. The proof of Theorem 3 may be found in the Appendix C, but the general idea is to show
the forced exploration ensures for sufficiently large t that the algorithm is almost always playing in
a point-local game that contains the optimal action and at this point the variance of the importance-
weighted estimators is well behaved.
5 Summary and open problems
We completed the classification of all finite partial monitoring games. Along the way we greatly
simplified existing algorithms and analysis and proved that for a large class of games the asymptotic
regret does not depend on arbitrarily large game-dependent constants, which is the first time this
has been demonstrated in the adversarial setting. There are many fascinating open problems. One
of the most interesting is to understand to what extent it is possible to adapt to ‘easy data’. For
example, globally observable games may have locally observable subgames and one might hope
for an algorithm with O(
√
n) regret if the adversary is playing in this subgame and O(n2/3)
regret otherwise. Another question is to refine the definition of the regret to differentiate between
algorithms in hopeless games where linear regret is unavoidable, but the coefficient can depend
on the algorithm [Rustichini, 1999]. Yet another question is to understand to what extent V is a
fundamental quantity in the regret for easy games and whether or not the arbitrarily large game-
dependent constants are real for large n as we have shown they are not for point-locally observable
games.
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A Redistribution properties
Here we collect a number of properties of the REDISTRIBUTE function in Algorithm 1.
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Lemma 4. Assume γ ∈ [0, 1/2] and let u ∈ PE−1, and k, a ∈ A arbitrary neighbors. Then
Pt ∈ PK−1 is a probability vector and the following hold:
(a) Pta ≥ P˜ta/4 ; (b)
∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
a=1
(Pta − P˜ta)〈ℓa, u〉
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ ;
(c) Ptb ≥ P˜tkQtka
4K
for any non-duplicate b ∈ Nka ; (d) Pta ≥ γ/K ;
(e) Ptd ≥ P˜tk
4K
for any d ∈ [K] such that ℓd = ℓk .
Proof. First we show that Pt is indeed a probability vector. By assumption P˜t is the stationary
distribution, which is a probability distribution. Let P¯t = REDISTRIBUTE(P˜t) so that
Pt = (1− γ)P¯t + γ
K
1 ,
which means we need to show that P¯t is a probability distribution. Since P¯t is obtained by the
iterative procedure given in the REDISTRIBUTE function it is sufficient to show that the vector q
tracked by this algorithm is indeed a distribution. The claim is that each loop of the REDISTRIBUTE
function does not break this property. The first observation is that the algorithm always moves mass
from actions in A to actions in D. All that must be shown is that P¯ta ≥ 0 for all a ∈ A. To see this
note first that if a ∈ A is one of the choices of the algorithm in Line 11, then ρcaqa ≤ pa/(2K) and
so
P¯ta ≥ P˜ta/2 for all a ∈ A ≥ 0 . (7)
Part (a): Since γ ≤ 1/2 this follows from Eq. (7).
Part (b): First we show that
∑
a∈[K](P¯ta − P˜ta)ℓa = 0. It suffices to show that the redistribution in
each inner loop of the algorithm does not change this value, which is true because
(caqa + cbqb)ℓd = (caqa + cbqb)(αℓa + (1− α)ℓb)
=
qaqb
αqb + (1− α)qa (αℓa + (1− α)ℓb)
= ρcaqaℓa + ρcbqbℓb .
Then using the definition of Pt we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈[K]
(Pta − P˜ta)〈ℓa, u〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈[K]
(Pta − P¯ta)〈ℓa, u〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = γ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a∈[K]
(
1
K
− P¯ta
)
〈ℓa, u〉
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ ,
where we used the assumption that ℓa ∈ [0, 1]E for all actions and u ∈ PE−1 so that 〈ℓa, u〉 ∈ [0, 1].
Part (c): There are three cases: Either b = k or b = a or b is degenerate. If b = k, then
the result is immediate from Part (a). If b = a, then, Part (a) combined with (3) implies that
Ptb = Pta ≥ P˜ta/4 ≥ P˜tkQtka/4 ≥ P˜tkQtka/(4K). Finally, if b is degenerate, then by the
definition of the rebalancing algorithm we have
P¯tb ≥ min(P˜tk, P˜ta)
2K
≥ min(P˜tk, P˜tkQtka)
2K
=
P˜tkQtka
2K
and the result follows from Eq. (7).
Part (d): This is trivial from the definition of Pt.
Part (e): Let b ∈ A be the Pareto optimal action chosen by the rebalancing algorithm when d is
given weight. Since ℓd = ℓa it follows that α = 1 and so ca = 1 and cb = 1, which means that
P¯td = P˜ta/2 and using Eq. (7) again yields the result.
B Proof of Theorem 2
We start by proving Lemma 2.
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Ca
Ca˜Cb
v
u
w
Proof of Lemma 2. Since u ∈ Ca˜, 0 ≤ 〈ℓa−ℓa˜, u〉. The result is trivial if a, a˜
are neighbors or 〈ℓa−ℓa˜, u〉 = 0. From now on assume that 〈ℓa−ℓa˜, u〉 > 0
and that a, a˜ are not neighbors. Let v be the centroid of Ca and consider the
line segment connecting v and u. Then let w be the first point on this line
segment for where there exists a b ∈ Na ∩ A with w ∈ Cb (see figure).
Note that w is well-defined by the Jordan-Brouwer separation theorem and
b is well-defined becauseA is a maximal duplicate-free subset of the Pareto
optimal actions. Using twice that 〈ℓa − ℓb, w〉 = 0, we calculate
〈ℓa − ℓb, u〉 = 〈ℓa − ℓb, u− w〉 = ‖u− w‖2‖v − w‖2
〈ℓa − ℓb, w − v〉 = ‖u− w‖2‖v − w‖2
〈ℓb − ℓa, v〉 > 0 ,
(8)
where the second equality used that w 6= v is a point of the line segment connecting v and u, hence
w − v and u − w are parallel and share the same direction and ‖v − w‖2 > 0. The last inequality
follows because v is the centroid of Ca and a, b are distinct Pareto optimal actions. Let vc be the
centroid of Cc for any c ∈ A. Then,
〈ℓa − ℓa˜, u〉
〈ℓa − ℓb, u〉 =
〈ℓa − ℓa˜, w + u− w〉
〈ℓa − ℓb, u〉
(a)
≤ 〈ℓa − ℓb, w〉 + 〈ℓa − ℓa˜, u− w〉〈ℓa − ℓb, u〉
(b)
=
〈ℓa − ℓa˜, u− w〉
〈ℓa − ℓb, u〉
(c)
=
‖v − w‖2 〈ℓa − ℓa˜, u− w〉
‖u− w‖2 〈ℓb − ℓa, v〉
(d)
≤ ‖v − w‖2 ‖ℓa − ℓa˜‖2〈ℓb − ℓa, v〉
(e)
≤
√
2E
minc∈Amind∈Nc〈ℓd − ℓc, vc〉
=
1
εG
,
where (a) follows since by (8), 〈ℓa−ℓb, u〉 > 0 and also becausew ∈ Cb implies that 〈ℓa−ℓa˜, w〉 ≤
〈ℓa− ℓb, w〉, (b) follows since 〈ℓa− ℓb, w〉 = 0 (which is used in other steps, too), (c) uses (8), (d) is
by Cauchy-Schwartz and in (e) we bounded ‖w − v‖2 ≤
√
2 and used that ‖ℓa − ℓa˜‖2 ≤
√
E and
〈ℓb − ℓa, v〉 = 〈ℓb − ℓa, va〉 ≥ minc∈Amind∈Nc〈ℓd − ℓc, vc〉 > 0. The final equality serves as the
definition of 1/εG.
Lemma 5. Let H be the set of functions φ : A → A with φ(a) ∈ Na for all a ∈ A and define
a∗n = argmina∈[K]
∑n
t=1〈ℓa, ut〉. Then, for any (Bt)1≤t≤n sequence of actions in A,
n∑
t=1
〈ℓBt − ℓa∗n , ut〉 ≤
1
εG
max
φ∈H
n∑
t=1
〈ℓBt − ℓφ(Bt), ut〉 .
Proof. With no loss of generality we assume that a∗n ∈ A because A is a maximal duplicate-free
subset of Pareto optimal actions. Apply the previous lemma on subsequences of rounds where
Bt = a for each a ∈ A.
Lemma 6. Let δ ∈ (0, 1). Then with probability at least 1− 2δ it holds that
Rn ≤ γn+ 1
εG
∑
k∈A
max
b∈Nk∩A
n∑
t=1
P˜tk
∑
a∈A
Qtka (yta − ytb) +
√
8n log(|H|/δ) .
Proof. For t ∈ [n], let Bt ∼ P˜t. Define the surrogate regret R′n =
∑n
t=1〈ℓBt − ℓa∗n , ut〉. By the
definition of At and Bt and part (b) of Lemma 4 we have Et−1[〈ℓAt − ℓBt , ut〉] ≤ γ. Furthermore,|〈ℓa − ℓb, ut〉| ≤ 1 for all a, b. Therefore, by Hoeffding-Azuma, with probability at least 1− δ,
Rn ≤ R′n + γn+
√
2n log(1/δ) . (9)
By Lemma 5, the surrogate regret is bounded in terms of the local regret:
R′n =
n∑
t=1
〈ℓBt − ℓa∗n , ut〉 ≤
1
εG
max
φ∈H
n∑
t=1
〈ℓBt − ℓφ(Bt), ut〉 . (10)
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We prepare to use Hoeffding-Azuma again. Fix φ ∈ H arbitrarily. Then,
Et−1
[〈ℓBt − ℓφ(Bt), ut〉] = ∑
k∈A
P˜tk
∑
a∈A
Qtka〈ℓa − ℓφ(k), ut〉 (11)
=
∑
k∈A
P˜tk
∑
a∈A
Qtka(yta − ytφ(k)) ,
where we used the fact that P˜ta =
∑
k P˜tkQtka. Hoeffding-Azuma’s inequality now shows that
with probability at least 1− δ/|H|,
n∑
t=1
〈ℓBt − ℓφ(Bt), ut〉 ≤
∑
k∈A
n∑
t=1
P˜tk
∑
a∈A
Qtka(yta − ytφ(k)) +
√
2n log(|H|/δ) .
The result is completed via a union bound over all φ ∈ H and chaining with Eqs. (9) and (10), and
noting that
max
φ
∑
k∈A
n∑
t=1
P˜tk
∑
a∈A
Qtka(yta − ytφ(k)) ≤
∑
k∈A
max
φ
n∑
t=1
P˜tk
∑
a∈A
Qtka(yta − ytφ(k))
=
∑
k∈A
max
b∈Nk∩A
n∑
t=1
P˜tk
∑
a∈A
Qtka(yta − ytb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rnk
.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof has two steps. First bounding the local regret Rnk for each k ∈ A
and then merging the bounds using the previous lemma.
Step 1: Bounding the local regret For the remainder of this step we fix k ∈ A and bound the local
regretRnk. First, we need to massage the local regret into a form in which we can apply Theorem 6,
which is a generic version of the Exp3.P analysis by Auer et al. [2002]. Let Ztka = P˜tk(yta − ytk)
and Gt be the σ-algebra generated by (A1, . . . , At) and G = (Gt)nt=0 be the associated filtration. A
simple rewriting shows that
Rnk = max
b∈Nk∩A
n∑
t=1
P˜tk
∑
a∈A
Qtka (yta − ytb) = max
b∈Nk∩A
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qtka (Ztka − Ztkb) .
In order to apply the result in Theorem 6 we need to check the conditions. Since (Pt)t and (P˜t)t
are G-predictable it follows that (βt)t and (Zt)t are also G-predictable. Similarly, (Zˆt)t is G-
adapted because (At)t and (Φt)t are G-adapted. It remains to show that assumptions (a–d) are
satisfied. For (a) let a ∈ Nk ∩ A. By Lemma 4.(d) we have Ptb ≥ γ/K for all t and b ∈ [K].
Furthermore, |vak(At,Φt)| ≤ V so that η|Zˆtka| = |ηP˜tkvak(At,Φt)/PtAt | ≤ ηV K/γ = 1,
where the equality follows from the choice of γ. Assumption (b) is satisfied in a similar way with
ηβtka = η
2V 2
∑
b∈Nak
P˜ 2tk/Ptb ≤ η2K2V 2/γ = ηKV ≤ 1, where in the last inequality we used
the definition of η and assumed that n ≥ K log(K/δ). To make sure that the regret bound holds
even for smaller values of n, we require CG ≥ K
√
log(eK) so that when n < K2 log(K/δ), the
regret bound is trivial. For assumption (c), we have
Et−1[Zˆ
2
tka] = Et−1

( P˜tkvak(At,Φt)
PtAt
)2 ≤ V 2P˜ 2tkEt−1
[
1Nak(At)
P 2tAt
]
= V 2
∑
b∈Nak
P˜ 2tk
Ptb
=
βtka
η
.
Finally (d) is satisfied by the definition of vak and the fact that Pt ∈ ri(PK−1). The result of
Theorem 6 shows that with probability at least 1− (K + 1)δ,
Rnk ≤ 3 log(1/δ)
η
+ 5
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈Nk∩A
Qtkaβtka + η
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈Nk∩A
QtkaZˆ
2
tka .
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Step 2: Aggregating the local regret Using the result from the previous step in combination with
a union bound over k ∈ A we have that with probability at least 1−K(K + 1)δ,
∑
k∈A
Rnk ≤ 3K log(1/δ)
η
+ 5
n∑
t=1
∑
k∈A
∑
a∈Nk∩A
Qtkaβtka + η
n∑
t=1
∑
k∈A
∑
a∈Na∩A
QtkaZˆ
2
tka . (12)
For bounding the second term we use the definition of βtka from (2) and write∑
a∈Nk∩A
Qtkaβtka = ηV
2
∑
a∈Nk∩A
Qtka
∑
b∈Nak
P˜ 2tk
Ptb
= ηV 2P˜tk
∑
a∈Nk∩A
Qtka
∑
b∈Nak
P˜tk
Ptb
.
The sum over b ∈ Nak is split into two, separating duplicates of k and the rest:∑
a∈Nk∩A
Qtka
∑
b∈Nak
P˜tk
Ptb
=
∑
a∈Nk∩A
Qtka
∑
b:ℓb=ℓk
P˜tk
Ptb
+
∑
a∈Nk∩A
Qtka
∑
b∈Nak:ℓb 6=ℓk
P˜tk
Ptb
=
∑
b:ℓb=ℓk
P˜tk
Ptb
+
∑
a∈Nk∩A
∑
b∈Nak:ℓb 6=ℓk
QtkaP˜tk
Ptb
≤ 4K

 ∑
b:ℓb=ℓk
1 +
∑
a∈Nk∩A
∑
b∈Nak:ℓb 6=ℓk
1

 ≤ 4K2 ,
where the first equality used that
∑
aQtka = 1, the second to last inequality follows using parts (c)
and (e) of Lemma 4, and the last inequality uses the reasoning above. Summing over all rounds and
k ∈ A yields
5
n∑
t=1
∑
k∈A
∑
a∈Nk∩A
Qtkaβtka ≤ 20ηnK2V 2 .
For the last term in Eq. (12) we use the definition of Zˆtka and Lemma 4.(c) to show that
η
n∑
t=1
∑
k∈A
∑
a∈Nk∩A
QtkaZˆ
2
tka = η
n∑
t=1
∑
k∈A
∑
a∈Nk∩A
QtkaP˜
2
tkv
ak(At,Φt)
2
P 2tAt
≤ ηV 2
n∑
t=1
1
PtAt
∑
k∈A
P˜tk
∑
a∈Nk∩A
QtkaP˜tk1Nak(At)
PtAt
≤ 4ηKV 2
n∑
t=1
1
PtAt
.
Now, from Lemma 4 (d), γ/K (1/Pta) ≤ 1 for all a, and in particular, holds for a = At.
Furthermore, Et−1[1/PtAt ] = K and Et−1[1/P
2
tAt
] =
∑
a 1/Pta ≤ K2/γ. By the result in
Lemma 10 it holds that with probability at least 1− δ that
n∑
t=1
1
PtAt
≤ 2nK + K log(1/δ)
γ
.
Another union bound shows that with probability at least 1− (1 +K(K + 1))δ,∑
k∈A
Rnk ≤ 3K log(1/δ)
η
+ 28ηnV 2K2 + 4VK log(1/δ) .
The result follows from the definition of η, Lemma 6 and the definition of Rnk.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Before the proof we need a simple lemma showing that if actions a and b are not weak neighbours,
then the regret of either a or b grows linearly in t.
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Lemma 7. There exists a game-dependent constant εG > 0 such that:
(a) If a and b are not weak neighbours, then infu∈PE−1〈ℓa + ℓb − 2ℓa∗u, u〉 ≥ εG.
(b) If u ∈ PE−1 andMu = {a : 〈ℓa − ℓa∗u , u〉 < εG}, then |Mu| ≤ Kloc.
Proof. For (a) let c ∈ [K] be arbitrary. Since Ca ∩ Cb = ∅ it follows that 〈ℓa + ℓb − 2ℓc, u〉 > 0
for all u ∈ Cc. By compactness of Cc and the continuity of the inner product in u we conclude that
infu∈Cc〈ℓa + ℓb − 2ℓc, u〉 > 0. Taking the minimum over all c shows that 2εG = infu∈PE−1〈ℓa +
ℓb − 2ℓa∗u, u〉 > 0. For (b), let a, b ∈ Mu. Then 〈ℓa + ℓb − 2ℓa∗u , u〉 < 2εG, which by (a) means
that a and b are weak neighbours. Therefore all actions inMu are weak neighbours of each other so
|Mu| ≤ Kloc.
The next lemma uses the concentration of the loss estimators to show that with high probability the
distribution P˜t calculated by RELEXP3 assigns negligible probability to actions that are either not
neighbours of Bt or for which the loss is large relative to the optimal action.
Lemma 8. Let Zta = 〈ℓa − ℓBt , ut〉 and Lta =
∑t
s=1 Zsa. Then there exists an event FAIL with
P (FAIL) ≤ 1/n and function g : N→ [0,∞) such that if FAIL does not hold, then
(a) P˜ta ≤ exp(−ηtg(t)) for all a that are not neighbours of Bt.
(b) P˜ta ≤ exp(−ηtg(t)) for all a with 〈ℓa − ℓa∗t , u¯t〉 ≥ εG.
(c) There exist constants c1, c2 ≥ 0 depending on G = (L,Φ) and the choice of ε in the
definition of αt such that for all t ≥ c1 logc2(n) it holds that g(t) ≥ 12εGt.
Proof. Define random variable φt = maxa,b |
∑t
s=1(Zˆsb − Zsb + Zsa − Zˆsa)|. Given an arbitrary
pair of arms (a, b), from the triangle inequality we have∣∣∣Lˆta − Lˆtb∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
s=1
(
Zˆsa − Zˆsb
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
s=1
(Zsa − Zsb)
∣∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
s=1
(
Zˆsa − Zsa + Zsb − Zˆsb
)∣∣∣∣∣
= |Lta − Ltb| −
∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
s=1
(
Zˆsa − Zsa + Zsb − Zˆsb
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ |Lta − Ltb| − φt .
The quantity φt is bounded with high probability via a union bound over all pairs of arms and
a martingale version of Bernstein’s bound [Freedman, 1975], which shows there exists a game-
dependent constant CG > 0 such that
P
(
exists t ∈ [n] : φt ≥ CGt3/4+ε/2 log 12 (n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
FAIL
) ≤ 1
n
.
Choose g(t) = max{0, (t− 1)εG − CGt3/4+ε/2 log 12 (n)}, which clearly satisfies the condition in
(c). First suppose that a is not a weak neighbour of Bt+1, which by the definition of Bt+1, φt and
Lemma 7 ensures that
Lˆta − LˆtBt+1 ≥ Lˆta + LˆtBt+1 − 2Lˆta∗t ≥ Lta + LtBt+1 − 2Lta∗t − 2φt ≥ tεG − 2φt .
On the other hand if 〈ℓa − ℓa∗t , u¯t〉 ≥ εG, then
Lˆta − LˆtBt+1 ≥ Lˆta − Lˆta∗t ≥ Lta − Lta∗t − 2φt ≥ tεG − 2φt .
The result follows from the fact that P˜ta ≤ exp(ηt(Lˆt−1,Bt − Lˆt−1,a)) for any action.
Proof of Theorem 3. Choose ε ∈ (0, 1/2) and
ηt = min

 14KV , 12Vloc
√
log(K)
2tKloc

 and αt = min
{
1
4K
, t−1/2−ε
}
.
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First note that the choices of ηt and αt ensures that ‖γt‖1 ≤ 1/2 and so Pt is indeed a probability
distribution and Pta ≥ P˜ta/2 for all t and a. Let Nt be the set of weak neighbours of Bt. Since
Et−1[Zˆta] = Zta we have for p = ea∗n that
E[Rn] = E
[
n∑
t=1
ZtAt − Zta∗n
]
= E
[
n∑
t=1
〈P˜t − p, Zt〉
]
+ E
[
n∑
t=1
〈γt − ‖γt‖1P˜t, Zt〉
]
≤ E
[
n∑
t=1
〈P˜t − p, Zˆt〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
R˜n
]
+ 2E
[
n∑
t=1
‖γt‖1
]
,
where in the inequality we used Cauchy-Schwartz and the fact that ‖Zt‖∞ ≤ 1. The analysis of
exponential weights given in Theorem 2.3 of the book by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] yields
E[R˜n] ≤ log(K)
(
2
ηn
+
1
η1
)
+
n∑
t=1
E
[
K∑
a=1
P˜taZˆta +
1
ηt
log
(
K∑
a=1
P˜ta exp
(
−ηtZˆta
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)t
]
.
Note that we have stopped the proof before the application of Hoeffding’s lemma, which is not
appropriate for bandits due to the large range of the loss estimates. Suppose that a ∈ Mt, then for
any b ∈ SaBt ⊆ St we have Ptb ≥ γtb ≥ ηtV aBt , which means that
ηt|Zˆta| = ηtv
aBt(At,Φt)
PtAt
≤ ηtV
aBt1SaBt (At)
PtAt
≤ 1 .
Then using exp(x) ≤ 1 + x+ x2 for x ≤ 1 leads to
P˜ta exp
(
−ηtZˆta
)
≤ P˜ta − ηtP˜taZˆta + η2t P˜taZˆ2ta .
On the other hand, if a /∈Mt then by the definitions ofMt, Zˆta and Pt,
P˜ta exp
(
−ηtZˆta
)
≤ P˜ta exp
(
ηt|Zˆta|
)
≤ P˜ta exp
(
ηtV
aBt
αt
)
≤ ηt
t
,
which by the fact that x ≤ 1 + x ≤ exp(x) for all x also implies that P˜taZˆta ≤ 1/t. Using
log(1 + x) ≤ x,
(A)t =
K∑
a=1
P˜taZˆta +
1
ηt
log
(
K∑
a=1
P˜ta exp
(
−ηtZˆta
))
≤
K∑
a=1
P˜taZˆta +
1
ηt
log
(
ηtK
t
+ 1− ηt
∑
a∈Mt
P˜taZˆta + η
2
t
∑
a∈Mt
P˜taZˆ
2
ta
)
≤ 2K
t
+ ηt
∑
a∈Mt
P˜taZˆ
2
ta ,
Next we bound the conditional second moment of Zˆta. If a and Bt are weak neighbours, then
P˜taEt−1[Zˆ
2
ta] = P˜taEt−1
[
vaBt(At,Φt)
2
P 2tAt
]
≤ P˜taV 2locEt−1
[
1 {At ∈ {a,Bt}}
P 2tAt
]
≤ 2V 2loc + o(1) ,
where in the last line we used the fact that PtAt ≥ Pta whenever At ∈ {a,Bt} and
Et−1[1 {At ∈ {a,Bt}}] = 2 and PtAt ≥ (1−‖γt‖1)P˜tAt = P˜tAt(1− o(1)). On the other hand, if
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a and Bt are not weak neighbours, then Et−1[Zˆ
2
ta] ≤ K2V 2/αt and so
n∑
t=1
E [(A)t] ≤
n∑
t=1
2K
t
+
n∑
t=1
ηtE
[ ∑
a∈Mt∩Nt
P˜taZˆ
2
ta
]
+
n∑
t=1
ηtE

 ∑
a∈Mt∩Nct
P˜taZˆ
2
ta


≤ 2V 2loc
n∑
t=1
ηtE [|Mt|] +K2V 2
n∑
t=1
ηt
αt
E

∑
a∈Nct
P˜ta

+ o(√n) . (13)
The second sum is bounded using parts (a) and (c) of Lemma 8, which shows that
n∑
t=1
ηt
αt
E

∑
a∈Nct
P˜ta

 ≤ P (FAIL) n∑
t=1
ηt
αt
+
n∑
t=1
ηt
αt
∑
a∈Nct
exp (−ηtg(t)) = o(
√
n) . (14)
Suppose that FAIL does not hold and define t0 by
t0 = min
{
t : for all s ≥ t, exp
(
ηsV
αs
− ηsg(s)
)
≤ ηs
s
}
,
which by part (c) of Lemma 8 and rearrangement satisfies t0 = O(polylog(n)). The definition of
t0 ensures that if t ≥ t0 and a is an action with 〈ℓa − ℓa∗
t−1
, u¯t−1〉 > εG, then
P˜ta exp
(
ηtV
aBt
αt
)
≤ exp
(
ηtV
aBt
αt
− ηtg(t)
)
≤ exp
(
ηtV
αt
− ηtg(t)
)
≤ ηt
t
and so a /∈Mt. Therefore when FAIL does not hold and t ≥ t0,
Mt ⊆ {a : 〈ℓa − ℓa∗
t−1
, u¯t−1〉 ≤ εG} .
But by Lemma 7 the number of arms in this set is at most Kloc and so in this case |Mt| ≤ Kloc.
Since |Mt| ≤ K regardless of t or the failure event,
n∑
t=1
ηtE[|Mt|] ≤ P (FAIL)
n∑
t=1
ηtK +
t0∑
t=1
ηtK +Kloc
n∑
t=t0+1
ηt = Kloc
n∑
t=1
ηt + o(
√
n) .
Combining the above display with Eqs. (13) and (14) shows that
n∑
t=1
E[(A)t] = 2V
2
locKloc
n∑
t=1
ηt + o(
√
n) .
Next we bound the sum of the expectations of ‖γt‖1. To begin notice that if Mt contains
only neighbours of Bt, then St = Mt and maxa∈Mt V
aBt ≤ Vloc. The definitions of γt and
αt = o(
√
1/t) means that ‖γt‖1 = ηt|St|maxa∈Mt V aBt + o(
√
1/t) and so the same argument as
above shows that
2E
[
n∑
t=1
‖γt‖1
]
= 2VlocKloc
n∑
t=1
ηt + o(
√
n) .
Putting the pieces together and using the fact that
∑n
t=1
√
1/t ≤ 2√n,
lim sup
n→∞
E[Rn]√
n
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1√
n
(
2 log(K)
ηn
+ 2KlocVloc(Vloc + 1)
n∑
t=1
ηt
)
= 8
√
2Vloc(1 + Vloc)Klocn log(K) .
The result is completed by recalling that vab(·) were chosen so that Vloc ≤ 1 + F .
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D Lower Bounds for Hard Games
In this section we prove a Ω(n2/3) lower bound on the minimax regret in hard partial monitoring
games. Like for bandits, by Yao’s minimax principle [Yao, 1977], the lower bounds are most easily
proven using a stochastic adversary. In stochastic partial monitoring we assume that u1, . . . , un
are chosen independently at random from the same distribution. To emphasise the randomness we
switch to capital letters. Given a partial monitoring problem G = (L,Φ) and a probability vector
u ∈ PE−1 the stochastic partial monitoring environment associated with u samples a sequence of
independently and identically distribution random variables U1, . . . , Un with Ut ∈ {e1, . . . , eE}
with P (Ut = ei) = ui. In each round t a policy chooses action At and receives feedback
Φt = Φ(At, Ut). The regret is
Rn(u, π,G) = max
a∈[K]
E
[
n∑
t=1
〈ℓAt − ℓa, Ut〉
]
= max
a∈[K]
E
[
n∑
t=1
〈ℓAt − ℓa, u〉
]
.
The mentioned minimax principle implies that R∗n(G) ≥ infπ supuRn(u, π,G). Hence, in what
follows, we lower bound supuRn(u, π,G) for fixed π.
Given u, v ∈ PE−1, let KL(u, v) be the relative entropy between categorical distributions with
parameters u and v respectively:
KL(u, v) =
K∑
i=1
ui log
(
ui
vi
)
≤
K∑
i=1
(ui − vi)2
vi
, (15)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that for measures P ≪ Q we have KL(P,Q) ≤
χ2(P,Q). We need one more simple result that is frequently used in lower bound proofs. Given
measures P and Q on the same probability space, Lemma 2.6 in the book by Tsybakov [2008] says
that for any event A,
P (A) +Q(Ac) ≥ 1
2
exp (−KL(P,Q)) . (16)
Theorem 4. Let G = (L,Φ) be a globally observable partial monitoring problem with that is not
locally observable. Then there exists a constant cG > 0 such that R
∗
n(G) ≥ cGn2/3.
Proof. The proof involves several steps. Roughly, we need to define two alternative stochastic partial
monitoring problems. We then show these environments are hard to distinguish without playing an
action associated with a large loss. Finally we balance the cost of distinguishing the environments
against the linear cost of playing randomly.
Fix a policy π and a partial monitoring game G with the required properties. For u ∈ PE−1 let Pu
denote the measure on sequences of outcomes (A1,Φ1, . . . , An,Φn) induced by the interaction of
a fixed policy and the stochastic partial monitoring problem determined by u and G and denote by
Eu the corresponding expectation. Note that Rn(π, u,G) = maxa Eu [
∑n
t=1〈ℓAt − ℓa, u〉].
Step 1: Defining the alternatives Let a, b be a pair neighbouring actions that are not locally
observable. Then by definition Ca ∩ Cb is a polytope of dimension E − 2. Let u be the centroid of
Ca ∩ Cb and
ε = min
c/∈Nab
〈ℓc − ℓa, u〉 . (17)
The value of ε is well-defined, since by global observability ofG, but nonlocal observability of (a, b)
there must exist some action c /∈ Nab. Furthermore, since c /∈ Nab it follows that ε > 0. We also
have u ∈ ri(PE−1). We now define two stochastic partial monitoring problems. Since (a, b) are not
locally observable, there is no function v : [K]× [F ]→ R such that for all i ∈ [E],∑
c∈Nab
v(c,Φci) = ℓai − ℓbi . (18)
To facilitate the next step we rewrite this using a linear structure. For action c ∈ [K] let
Sc ∈ {0, 1}F×E be the matrix with (Sc)fi = 1 {Φ(c, i) = f}, which is chosen so that Scei = eΦci .
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Define the linear map S : RE → R|Nab|F by
S =


Sa
Sb
...
Sc

 ,
which is the matrix formed by stacking the matrices {Sc : c ∈ Nab}. Then there exists a v satisfying
Eq. (18) if and only if there exists a vector w ∈ R|Nab|F such that
ℓa − ℓb = w⊤S .
In other words, actions (a, b) are locally observable if and only if ℓa−ℓb ∈ img(S⊤). Since we have
assumed that (a, b) are not locally observable, it follows that ℓa− ℓb /∈ img(S⊤). Let z ∈ img(S⊤)
and w ∈ ker(S) be such that ℓa − ℓb = z + w, which is possible since img(S⊤) ⊕ ker(S) = RE .
Since ℓa− ℓb /∈ img(S⊤) it holds that w 6= 0 and 〈w, ℓa− ℓb〉 = 〈w, z +w〉 = 〈w,w〉 6= 0. Finally
let v = w/〈w, ℓa − ℓb〉. It follows that Sv = 0 and 〈v, ℓa − ℓb〉 = 1.2 Let ∆ > 0 be some small
constant to be tuned subsequently and define ua = u−∆v and ub = u+∆v so that
〈ℓb − ℓa, ua〉 = ∆ and 〈ℓa − ℓb, ub〉 = ∆ .
We note that if∆ is sufficiently small, then ua ∈ Ca∩ri(PE−1) and ub ∈ Cb∩ri(PE−1). This means
that action a is optimal if the environment plays ua on average and b is optimal if the environment
plays ub on average and that ua and ub are in the relative interior of the (E−1)-simplex (see Fig. 1).
Step 2: Calculating the relative entropy Given action c andw ∈ PE−1 let Pcw be the distribution
on the feedback observed by the learner when playing action c in stochastic partial monitoring
environment determined by w. That is Pcw(f) = Pw(Φt = f |At = c) = (Scw)f . Let Tc(n) be the
number of times action c is played over all n rounds. The chain rule for relative entropy shows that
KL(Pua ,Pub) =
∑
c∈[K]
Eua [Tc(n)] KL(Pcua ,Pcub) . (19)
By definition of ua and ub we have Scua = Scub for all c ∈ Nab. Therefore Pcua = Pcub
and so KL(Pcua ,Pcub) = 0 for all c ∈ Nab. On the other hand, if c /∈ Nab, then thanks to
ua, ub, u ∈ ri(PE−1) and Eq. (15),
KL(Pcua ,Pcub) ≤ KL(ua, ub) ≤
E∑
i=1
(uai − ubi)2
ubi
= 4∆2
K∑
i=1
v2i
ui −∆vi ≤ Cu∆
2 ,
where Cu is a suitably large constant and we assume that ∆ is chosen sufficiently small that
ui −∆vi ≥ ui/2. Therefore
KL(Pua ,Pub) ≤ CuEua [T˜ (n)]∆2 , (20)
where T˜ (n) is the number of times an arm not in Nab is played:
T˜ (n) =
∑
c/∈Nab
Tc(n) .
Step 3: Comparing the regret By Eq. (17) and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality for c /∈ Nab we
have 〈ℓc − ℓa, ua〉 = ε + 〈ℓc − ℓa,∆v〉 ≥ ε − 2∆ ‖v‖∞ and 〈ℓc − ℓb, ub〉 ≥ ε − 2∆ ‖v‖∞. By
Lemma 1, for each action c ∈ Nab there exists an α ∈ [0, 1] such that ℓc = αℓa + (1 − α)ℓb.
Therefore
〈ℓc − ℓa, ua〉+ 〈ℓc − ℓb, ub〉 = (1− α)〈ℓb − ℓa, ua〉+ α〈ℓa − ℓb, ub〉 = ∆ , (21)
which means that max(〈ℓc − ℓa, ua〉, 〈ℓc − ℓb, ub〉) ≥ ∆/2. Define T¯ (n) as the number of times
some arm in Nab is played that is at least ∆/2 suboptimal in ua:
T¯ (n) =
∑
c∈Nab
1
{
〈ℓc − ℓa, ua〉 ≥ ∆
2
}
Tc(n) .
2The minor error in Barto´k et al. [2014] appears in their definition of v, which is in the kernel of a different
S constructed by stacking just Sa and Sb and not the degenerate/duplicate actions in between.
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Assume that ∆ is chosen sufficiently small so that 2∆ ‖v‖∞ ≤ ε/2. Then
Rn(π, ua, G) +Rn(π, ub, G) = Eua

∑
c∈[K]
Tc(n)〈ℓc − ℓa, ua〉

+ Eub

 ∑
c∈[K]
Tc(n)〈ℓc − ℓb, ub〉


≥ ε
2
Eua
[
T˜ (n)
]
+
n∆
4
(
Pua(T¯ (n) ≥ n/2) + Pub(T¯ (n) < n/2)
)
≥ ε
2
Eua
[
T˜ (n)
]
+
n∆
8
exp (−KL(Pua ,Pub))
≥ ε
2
Eua
[
T˜ (n)
]
+
n∆
8
exp
(
−Cu∆2Eua
[
T˜ (n)
])
,
In the above display we used (21) and∑
c
Tc(n)1 {〈ℓc − ℓb, ub〉 > ∆/2} =
∑
c
Tc(n)1 {〈ℓc − ℓa, ua〉 ≤ ∆/2} = n− T¯ (n) ,
where the second inequality follows from the high probability version of Pinsker’s inequality
Eq. (16) and the third from Eq. (20). The bound is completed by a simple case analysis. If
Eua [T˜ (n)] > n
2/3, the result holds for any value of ∆. Otherwise choosing ∆ = (c/n)1/3 for
appropriate positive game-dependent constant c establishes the bound.
C1
C2u
u1
u2
C3
Figure 1: Lower bound construction for hard partial monitoring problems
E Lower Bound for Theorem 3
We consider the following game with K = 2 and E = 2F − 2 andG = (L,Φ) given by
L =
(
1 0 1 0 · · · 1 0
0 1 0 1 · · · 0 1
)
, Φ =
(
1 2 2 3 3 4 · · · F − 1 F − 1 F
1 1 2 2 3 3 · · · F − 2 F − 1 F − 1
)
.
Theorem 5. For n sufficiently large the minimax regret of G is at least R∗n(G) ≥ F−145
√
n.
Proof. Let ∆ =
√
1/(17n) and u ∈ PE−1 be constants to be tuned subsequently and u′ ∈ PE−1
by u′i = ui + 2(−1)i∆. Using the notation of the previous section we have
KL(P1u,P1u′) ≤ χ2(P1u,P2u′) = 4∆2
(
1
u′1
+
1
u′E
)
and KL(P2u, P2u′) = 0 .
Let p = 1/2− (E− 2)∆/4 and choose u1 = p+∆ and uE = p−∆ and for i ∈ {2, . . . , E− 1} let
ui = ∆(1−(−1)i). For sufficiently large horizon,∆ is small enough so thatKL(P1u,P1u′) ≤ 17∆2
and
KL(Pu,Pu′) = Eu[T1(n)] KL(P1u,P1u′) ≤ 17n∆2 .
Using the fact that Rn(u) = 2∆(F − 1)Eu[T1(n)] and Rn(u′) = 2∆(F − 1)Eu′ [T2(n)] leads to
Rn(u) +Rn(u
′) ≥ n(F − 1)∆
2
exp
(−n17∆2) = (F − 1)√ n17
2e
.
The result follows sincemax(a, b) ≥ (a+ b)/2 and by naive simplification.
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F Generic Bound for Exponential Weights
The proof of Theorem 2 depends on a generic regret analysis for a variant of the EXP3.P bandit
algorithm by Auer et al. [1995]. The main difference is that loss estimators are assumed to be
god-given and satisfy certain properties, rather than being explicitly defined as biased importance-
weighted estimators. Nothing here would startle an expert, but we do not know where an equivalent
result is written in the literature. Let (Ω,F , (Ft)nt=0,P) be a filtered probability space and abbreviate
Et[·] = E[·|Ft]. To reduce clutter we assume for the remainder that t ranges in [n] and a ∈ [K].
Recall that a sequence of random elements (Xt) is called adapted if Xt is Ft-measurable for all t,
while (Xt) is called predictable if Xt is Ft−1-measurable for all t. Let (Zt) and (Z˜t) be sequences
of random elements in RK . Given nonemptyA ⊆ [K] and positive constant η define the probability
vectorQt ∈ PK−1 by
Qta =
1A(a) exp
(
−η∑t−1s=1 Z˜sa)∑
b∈A exp
(
−η∑t−1s=1 Z˜sb) .
Theorem 6. Assume that the RK-valued process (Zt)t is predictable, the R
K-valued process (Z˜t)t
is adapted and that Z˜t = Zˆt − βt, where (Zˆt)t is adapted and (βt)t is predictable. Assume the
following hold for all a ∈ A:
(a) η|Zˆta| ≤ 1 , (b) ηβta ≤ 1 ,
(c) ηEt−1[Zˆ
2
ta] ≤ βta almost surely , (d) Et−1[Zˆta] = Zta almost surely .
Let A∗ = argmina∈A
∑n
t=1 Zta. Then, for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/(K + 1), with probability at least
1− (K + 1)δ,
n∑
t=1
K∑
a=1
Qta(Zta − ZtA∗) ≤ 3 log(1/δ)
η
+ η
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
QtaZˆ
2
ta + 5
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qtaβta .
Proof. We proceed in five steps.
Step 1: Decomposition
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qta(Zta − ZtA∗)
=
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qta(Z˜ta − Z˜tA∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qta(Zta − Z˜ta)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+
n∑
t=1
(Z˜tA∗ − ZtA∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
.
Step 2: Bounding (A) By assumption (c) we have βta ≥ 0, which by assumption (a) means
that ηZ˜ta ≤ ηZˆta ≤ η|Zˆta| ≤ 1 for all a ∈ A. Then the standard mirror descent analysis with
negentropy regularisation [Hazan, 2016] shows that (A) is bounded by
(A) ≤ log(K)
η
+ η
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
QtaZ˜
2
ta
=
log(K)
η
+ η
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qta(Zˆ
2
ta + β
2
ta)−
2η
1− γ
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
QtaZˆtaβta
≤ log(K)
η
+ η
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
QtaZˆ
2
ta + 3
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qtaβta ,
where in the last two line we used the assumptions that ηβta ≤ 1 and η|Zˆta| ≤ 1.
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Step 3: Bounding (B) For (B) we have
(B) =
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qta(Zta − Z˜ta) =
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qta(Zta − Zˆta + βta) .
We prepare to use Lemma 10. By assumptions (c) and (d) respectively we have ηEt−1[Zˆ
2
ta] ≤ βta
and Et−1[Zˆta] = Zta. By Jensen’s inequality,
ηEt−1

(∑
a∈A
Qta(Zta − Zˆta)
)2 ≤ η∑
a∈A
QtaEt−1[Zˆ
2
ta] ≤
∑
a∈A
Qtaβta .
Therefore by Lemma 10, with probability at least 1− δ
(B) ≤ 2
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qtaβta +
log(1/δ)
η
.
Step 4: Bounding (C) For (C) we have
(C) =
n∑
t=1
(Z˜tA∗ − ZtA∗) =
n∑
t=1
(
ZˆtA∗ − ZtA∗ − βtA∗
)
.
Because A∗ is random we cannot directly apply Lemma 10, but need a union bound over all actions.
Let a ∈ A be fixed. Then by Lemma 10 and the assumption that η|Zˆta| ≤ 1 and Et−1[Zˆta] = Zta
and ηEt−1[Zˆ
2
ta] ≤ βta, with probability at least 1− δ.
n∑
t=1
(
Zˆta − Zta − βta
)
≤ log(1/δ)
η
.
Therefore by a union bound we have with probability at most 1−Kδ,
(C) ≤ log(1/δ)
η
.
Step 5: Putting it together Combining the bounds on (A), (B) and (C) in the last three steps with
the decomposition in the first step shows that with probability at least 1− (K + 1)δ,
Rn ≤ 3 log(1/δ)
η
+ η
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
QtaZˆ
2
ta + 5
n∑
t=1
∑
a∈A
Qtaβta .
where we used the assumption that δ ≤ 1/K .
G Bounding the Norm of the Estimators
Lemma 9. Let a and b be pairwise observable and ∆ = ℓa − ℓb ∈ [−1, 1]E, then there exists a
function v : {a, b} × [F ]→ R such that:
(a) ‖v‖∞ ≤ 1 + F .
(b) v(a,Φai) + v(b,Φbi) = ∆i for all i ∈ [E].
Proof. By the definition of pairwise observable there exists a function v : {a, b}×[F ]→ R such that
v(a,Φai) + v(b,Φbi) = ∆i for all i ∈ [E]. Define bipartite graph with vertices V = {a, b} × [F ]
and edges E = {((a,Φai), (b,Φbi)) : i ∈ [E]}. Assume without loss of generality this graph is
fully connected. If not then apply the following procedure to each connected component. For any
f, f ′ ∈ [F ] let (a, f1), (b, f2), (a, f3), . . . , (a, fk) be a loop free path with f1 = f and fk = f ′ and
for j ∈ [k − 1] let ij ∈ [E] correspond to the edge connecting (·, fj) and (·, fj+1). Then
|v(a, f)− v(a, f ′)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
k−1∑
j=1
(−1)j−1∆ij
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2F .
We may assume that maxf∈[F ] |v(a, f)| ≤ 12 maxf,f ′∈[F ] |v(a, f) − v(a, f ′)|, which is always
possible by translating v(a, ·) by a constant α and v(b, ·) by −α. Finally for each f ∈ [F ]
there exists an f ′ ∈ [F ] and i ∈ [E] such that v(b, f) + v(a, f ′) = ∆i, which ensures that
|v(b, f)| ≤ |v(a, f ′)|+ |∆i| ≤ F + 1.
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H Concentration
Lemma 10. LetX1, X2, . . . , Xn be a sequence of random variables adapted to filtration (Ft)t and
let Et[·] = E[·|Ft] and µt = Et−1[Xt]. Suppose that η > 0 satisfies ηXt ≤ 1 almost surely. Then
P
(
n∑
t=1
(Xt − µt) ≥ η
n∑
t=1
Et−1[X
2
t ] +
1
η
log
(
1
δ
))
≤ δ .
Proof. Let σ2t = Et−1[X
2
t ]. By Chernoff’s method we have
P
(
n∑
t=1
(
Xt − µt − ησ2t
) ≥ log(1/δ)
η
)
= P
(
exp
(
η
n∑
t=1
(
Xt − µt − ησ2t
)) ≥ 1
δ
)
≤ δE
[
exp
(
η
n∑
t=1
(
Xt − µt − ησ2t
))]
.
The result is completed by showing the term inside the expectation is a supermartingale. For this,
we have
Et−1
[
exp
(
η
(
Xt − µt − ησ2t
))]
= exp
(−ηµt − η2σ2t )Et−1 [exp (ηXt)]
≤ exp (−ηµt − η2σ2t ) (1 + ηµt + η2σ2t ) ≤ 1 ,
where we used the inequalities exp(x) ≤ 1 + x+ x2 for x ≤ 1 and 1 + x ≤ exp(x) for all x ∈ R.
Chaining the above inequality completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let Λ be the smallest value such thatX ≤ Y +√2a log(b/Λ), which is almost
surely positive. Taking expectations of both sides shows that
E[X ] ≤ E[Y ] +√2aE[
√
log(b/Λ)]
The second expectation is bounded by
E[
√
log(b/Λ)] =
∫ ∞
0
P
(√
log(b/Λ) ≥ x
)
dx
≤ inf
y>0
y +
∫ ∞
y
P
(√
log(b/Λ) ≥ x
)
dx
≤ inf
y>0
y +
∫ ∞
y
P
(
Λ ≤ b exp(−x2)) dx
≤ inf
y>0
y +
∫ ∞
y
b exp(−x2)dx
= inf
y>0
y +
b
√
π
2
erfc(y)
=
√
log(b) +
b
√
π
2
erfc(
√
log(b))
≤
√
1 + log(b) .
I Gallery
Exhibit 1. In the following game the learner cannot estimate the actual losses, but the loss
differences can be calculated from the feedback directly.
L =
(
1 1/2 1/2 0
1/2 1 0 1/2
)
, Φ =
(
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
)
.
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Exhibit 2. A useful way to think about the cell decomposition is to assume that L has positive
entries and consider the intersection of the hypograph of concave function f(u) = mina〈ℓa, u〉with
domain u = PE−1 and the epigraph of PE−1. To illustrate the idea let G = (L,Φ) be the variant of
the spam game where c = 1/3, which is defined by
L =

1 00 1
1
3
1
3

 , Φ =
(
1 1
1 1
1 2
)
.
In this case PE−1 = P1 is 1-dimensional, which means the intersection of the epigraph of PE−1
and the hypograph of f is 2-dimensional and is shown in the left figure below. The intersection is
itself a polytope and the faces (1-dimensional in this case) pointing upwards correspond to cells of
nondegenerate actions. If c is increased to 1/2, then the third action becomes degenerate, which is
observable from the right-hand figure below by noting that the dimension of its intersection with the
polytope is now zero. Increasing c any further would make this action dominated.
〈ℓ3, u〉
〈ℓ1, u〉
〈ℓ2, u〉
u1
c = 1/3
〈ℓ3, u〉
〈ℓ1, u〉
〈ℓ2, u〉
u1
c = 1/2
Figure 2: Alternative view of cell decomposition for spam game with c = 1/3 and c = 1/2.
Exhibit 3. The following game demonstrates that not all locally observable games are point-locally
observable.
L =
(
0 1 1
1 0 1
1/2 1/2 1/2
)
, Φ =
(
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 3
)
.
C3
C2
C1
u1
u2
The cell decomposition for this game is shown on above-right. Notice that (1, 2) are not neighbours,
but are weak neighbours. And yet (1, 2) are not pairwise observable. Therefore the game is not
point-locally observable. On the other hand, both sets of neighbours (1, 2) and (1, 3) are locally
observable.
Exhibit 4. This game produces the cell decomposition depicted at the start of Section 3. The only
neighbours are (2, 3) and (1, 3), which are locally observable. Therefore the game is locally observ-
able. Actions 4,5 and 6 are degenerate. NEIGHBOURHOODWATCH2 will only play actions 1, 2,
3 and 4 with actions 5 and 6 ruled out because their cells are not equal to the intersection of any
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neighbours cells. Notice that ℓ4 = ℓ2/2 + ℓ3/2 is a convex combination of ℓ2 and ℓ3.
L =


0 1 1
1 0 1
1/2 1/2 1/2
3/4 1/4 3/4
1 1/2 1/2
1 1/4 3/4

 , Φ =


1 1 1
1 1 1
1 2 3
1 1 1
1 1 1

 .
C3
C2
C1
u1
u2
C4
C5
C6
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